نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Explaining how divine knowledge pertains to creatures before their creation is a longstanding concern for theists. On one hand, they cannot consider God ignorant of matters such as human voluntary actions or allow error in His knowledge; on the other hand, they cannot deny the dichotomy of voluntary and involuntary actions, which they acknowledge based on a certain form of intuition. Consequently, each group has endeavored to find a way to resolve the apparent conflict between divine foreknowledge and human free will. Based on the method of logical analysis of concepts, and on the hypothesis that this conflict is a prima facie conflict and cannot be considered among the established, [intractable] ones, this article analyzes the quiddity and existence of knowledge and free will, thereby opening a new path toward resolving the problem of the conflict between foreknowledge and free will. By demonstrating the relationship of possession and [non-existence in the sense of] privation (ʿadam wa malaka) between knowledge and ignorance, it is proven that not only the negation of absolute knowledge, but the negation of knowledge absolutely from the Necessary Being (Wājib al-Wujūd) does not lead to a deficiency in His holy essence. Furthermore, by removing will from the list of psychological states, this research reveals the negligence evident in the translation of the concept, aiming to fundamentally address and resolve this conflict.
کلیدواژهها English
